Resilience guiding innovation policy––Is that a good idea?

Rajesh Gopalakrishnan Nair, TD School, University of Technology Sydney

Resilience has been introduced as a complement to innovation as the central doctrine in Australia’s Science Technology and Innovation (STI) policy narrative. The 2026 Federal budget underlines this shift.

The budget is differentially influenced by two important government reports namely Ambitious Australia (2025), the final report of the SERD panel, and the Productivity Commission’s inquiry report Creating a more dynamic and resilient economy (2025).

Ambitious Australia recommended institutional innovation by setting up a National Innovation Council (NIC) as an apex direction-setting and coordinating body bringing order to the RD&I policy, which is currently fragmented and spread across dozens of agencies and programs. The Productivity Commission recommended easing regulatory and tax barriers that are dampening market dynamism, competition and economic resilience, which in turn is preventing firms from being innovative by participating in market competition.     

The 2026 Federal budget appears to have chosen resilience over institutional innovation as its guiding principle, and in that context replaced the NIC with a new ‘Resilience and Science Council’. While the terms of reference of the new council are not yet public, this essay hypothesises that this move signals a shift in the national priority, from innovation to resilience.   

The Budget is not the ultimate policy statement. But as a document that translates political ambition into economic reality, it signals the governmental intent. This should legitimise the opening statement, at least as a working hypothesis. Based on an exploratory review of the theoretical foundations of resilience, I argue that the budget pivots an emerging innovation policy narrative to orthodoxy, and away from a transformative turn.

The essay attempts a cautious critique of resilience as an economic phenomenon––through a reasoned history of Australia’s resilience narrative.  

What is resilience?

Resilience originated from Latin resilio (‘to jump back’) and migrated across physics, ecology, social policy, disaster management, economics and political science (Mohaupt, 2009).  The concept was introduced in ecological science in the early 1970s. Considerable ambiguity shrouds the concept because of its widespread use across disciplines without definitions (Rose, 2007). This has made it a target of criticism for being a fuzzy, shallow, shifting, and contested concept, showing tendencies of a political rhetoric (Joseph, 2013; Martin, 2012; Rogers, 2015).

A common feature across available definitions is as a response (survival, avoidance, absorption, coping, adaptation, recovery, self-organisation, rebuilding, etc.) to adversity or change (external shocks, disturbances, hazards, threats, developmental disruptions, etc.) (Downes et al., 2013).

Some suspect its recent surge in policy literature as indicating a ‘fit with the neoliberal discourse’ seeking ‘active citizenship and self-reliance’, whereby people, rather than relying on the state, take responsibility for their own social and economic well-being (Evenhuis, 2017; Joseph, 2013; Martin, 2012).

Positive and negative binaries of articulation of resilience abound in policy rhetoric – ‘participation, empowerment and agency’ versus ‘withdrawal of government-coordinated safety nets and financial support structures for those rendered vulnerable.’ Researchers and practitioners worry about potential (mis)use of such binaries as political rhetoric, without much mitigation impact (Hassink, 2010; Rogers, 2015).

What is economic resilience?

There are three broad conceptualisations of resilience, from the neoclassical, ecological and evolutionary economics perspectives. Table-1 gives a comparison.

Table-1: Conceptualisation of resilience in economic theories (after Evenhuis, 2017)

	Neoclassical	Ecological	Evolutionary
Adaptation	Rebound: return to equilibrium	Shift: move to multiple equilibria	Transform: renewal and creative destruction as ‘non-equilibrium’ processes.
Time frame	Short term	Short term	Long term
Shocks that can be addressed	Small emergencies	Large emergencies	Grand challenges
Reorganisation	Not problematised	Minor changes in configuration.	Structural changes and institutional transformation
Reorientation	Not problematised	Temporary new activities & functions.	Permanent new activities & functions.

Neoclassical economics and its sub-discipline, environmental economics, employ an equilibrium-based engineering analogy. This ‘engineering resilience’ captures the inherent capacity of the economy to bounce back after exposure to exogenous disequilibrating shocks (Holling, 1973). It also assumes perfect information, rational profit-maximising behaviour, independent decision-making, flexible prices and market clearing, and diminishing marginal utility.

In contrast, ecological and evolutionary conceptualisations of resilience are modelled on biological analogies. Ecological resilience is the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its configuration across, not one, but several equilibria (Holling-1996, n.d.). It is a short-term phenomenon leading to incremental changes in system composition as adaptations, without drastically changing the system functions (Evenhuis, 2017).

The evolutionary approach focuses on non-equilibrium processes in which heterogeneous agents learn and adapt both within and outside markets under conditions of bounded rationality (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Endogenous preferences and innovations, knowledge-based and capability-based firms in national systems of innovation, and their coordination produce structural changes through a continuous process of creative destruction and renewal. Structural changes prepare the economic system to survive destructive impacts of ‘change’ and harness its creative potential (Evenhuis, 2017). 

Thus, if the policy objective is to acquire long-term system capability to adapt and reconfigure industrial, technological, and institutional structures when confronted by disruptive events such as massive technological change, the desirable pathway is evolutionary structural change. The underlying assumptions and the overarching ambition of the neoclassical conceptualisation of economic resilience are unfit for this purpose.        

The paradox of economic resilience.

The OECD defines economic resilience as the capability of the economy to recover its pre-shock equilibrium growth. A resilient economy is “. . . one that better withstands an adverse shock and returns faster to the pre-shock trend growth rate (i.e. minimising the cumulative GDP loss relative to potential output) . . .” (Sánchez et al., 2015). Conversely, this is what (Holling, 1973; Holling-1996, n.d.) defines explicitly as ‘stability’ or ‘engineering resilience.’  Recasting stability as economic resilience confines the idea to a narrow, market equilibrium-bound definition. Often, this paradox is recognised as a neoliberal construct (Filion et al., 2013; Martin, 2012).

According to the neoclassical theory, aggressive state intervention through discretionary fiscal stimuli and financial bailouts produces opportunity costs of long-term structural vulnerabilities and moral hazards. Structure, in this context, refers to market concentration, property rights, technology, and variables defining conditions for market clearing.

Unrestricted trade unionism, minimum-wage laws and long-term pay contracts distort price signals and produce institutional rigidity. A short-term remedy is structural adjustment, that is, downward adjustment of price factors and breaking of rigidities, particularly those arising from workers and trade unions.

The ultimate pathway to economic efficiency is structural reform, which in the neoclassical definition includes deregulation, trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation, decentralising collective labour bargaining, taxes and fiscal restructuring, and removal of market barriers.

Who bears the cost of economic resilience?

Contemporary economic resilience frameworks adopt a synthetic approach: a combination of Keynesian “counter-cyclical fiscal policies” during recession, to manage aggregate demand and “macroprudential measures” (increased cash reserves, restricted lending) in the boom phase. These cyclical interventions are reinforced by long-term tax and labour market frameworks designed for structural adaptability (Sánchez et al., 2015).

The economic resilience model intends to serve a societal function by creating the perception of a state responsive to risks. Thereby it satisfies society’s psychological need for risk aversion and security, not through improved welfare measures but “. . . by fanning politics of envy to foster a race to the bottom as regards wages, benefits and social programs . . .”. (Filion et al., 2013). Consequently, macroeconomic resilience comes at a cost. The ultimate question is who bears it?

Jargon perhaps conceals the practical reality of this resilience model. Instruments like ‘wage adjustment’ and ‘labour reallocation’ often translate into wage cuts and job insecurity. Macroprudential measures, while insulating the financial system from collapse (by restricting credit and cooling growth), expose the labour sector to vulnerabilities. But there are wider macroeconomic implications for this ‘short-termist’ resilience model.   

Critical introspection

Mainstream economists tend not to recognise the shortcomings of this model. It fails to predict major crises and to handle conditions of high uncertainty and resource underutilisation. Its standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model fails to manage major downturns. The model ignores catastrophic endogenous shocks such as asset bubbles, while over-focussing on exogenous ones. It doesn’t explain why markets amplify disruptions and recover slowly (Stiglitz, 2011).

This leaves ‘economic resilience’ inherently problematic. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz says

“. . . much of modern macroeconomics . . . constructed models centering around special cases where market inefficiencies do not arise, and where the scope for welfare-enhancing government intervention, either to prevent a crisis or to accelerate a recovery, is accordingly limited. This has made the models of limited relevance either for prediction, explanation, or policy—at least in times of severe downturns, when markets evidently are working so poorly . . ."

Further, he points to the necessity of a systemic approach to the model––endogenising government, policy and political actors- that accounts for credit chains, information asymmetries and agency issues (Stiglitz, 2011).

 ‘Structural competitiveness’ embodies what Stiglitz identifies as lacking in the macroeconomic model.

Structural competitiveness

The concept of Structural Competitiveness emerged in the early 1980s as a substitute for the naïve short-term view of competitiveness as a factor of wages and currency rates (Lundvall, 2004a). Its alternative model of long-term competitiveness rejected the neoclassical reductionist view of the nation-state as a mere ensemble of disconnected ‘factors-of-production’.

Structural competitiveness focuses on non-price factors such as the strength and efficiency of an economy’s productive structure, the corresponding long-term trends in the rate and structure of capital investment, inter-sectoral linkages, seamless diffusion of technology, and the national technical infrastructure. Investments in knowledge infrastructure and human capital are central to it (Chesnais, 1991).

Paradoxically, the idea was born inside the sanctum of neoliberalism, the OECD. Predictably, papers that introduced it, produced by the OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation (DSTI), remained unpublished until 2004 (Lundvall, 2004a). Later, it was subsumed under the National Innovation System (NSI) framework.

Studies on Japanese industrial surge vis-à-vis America’s declining comparative advantage in the 1970s and 80s demonstrated that effective economic performance, in different epochs, required different sets of institutions and the active governmental role in building and coordinating them (Freeman, 2004).

Successful countries that caught up in the developmental race (Japan, Korea and China) have all demonstrated this governmental role in guiding the direction of development, through initial protectionism (import substitution), high rates of savings and investment, absorbing technological knowledge from abroad, and expanding the manufacturing sector (Lundvall, 2004b).

Work on National Systems of Innovation (NSI) did establish standard economics’ incapability to grasp the processes of innovation and competence building. But it gradually moved away from the critique of its neoliberal free trade doctrine. This retreat, perhaps, has crippled an evolutionary critique of economic resilience, founded on structural competitiveness, from fully emerging. Overwhelming empirical evidence, particularly from Latin America, demonstrates that free trade might not always be advantageous (Lundvall, 2004a). 

Instead, a country’s proclivity to institutional innovation (how it moulds new institutional structures) when new technological opportunities come into clear view is a crucial determinant of its economic performance and other attributes of resilience (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  

Evolution of the Australian resilience narrative

Economic resilience was not a major theme in the national policy until the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Nevertheless, events leading up to the GFC help place the Australian resilience narrative in context.  

Since federation, the Australian economy was designed to be insulative, rather than resilient. This design was a response to the financial system collapse of the 1890s (which triggered the move to federation), when the non-federated colonies were exposed to both internal and international financial shocks.

The Federal policy, popularly called ‘Fortress Australia', incorporated protective tariffs, immigration control, industrial arbitration and old-age pension. This protectionist model, enshrined in the broader social experimentation of ‘Australian Settlement ’, did prepare Australia to forestall a complete collapse during the 1930s Great Depression (Fenna, 2010, 2012; Kent, 2011).

From Keynesian interventionism to NPM.

Despite the collapse of exports, mounting public debt, and a crippling current account deficit, Australia managed the recession successfully, thanks to fortress-style protectionism, wage reductions, currency devaluation, and the Premiers’ Plan for interest-rate reductions and deflationary measures. The Premiers’ Plan was endorsed by Keynes himself (Keynes JM, 1932), whose 1936 General Theory Australia would embrace as national policy, under the 1945 White Paper on Full Employment.

The Keynesian paradigm, a combination of structural diversification balancing commodity shocks, and labour market regulations optimising cross-sectoral wage disparities, inaugurated a ‘golden age’ of high growth, low inflation and full employment. It lasted until the 1970’s stagflation crisis (Bhattacharyya & Williamson, 2011). 

The model was challenged in the early 1950s. Under an inflationary wage-price spiral caused by the ‘wool-boom’ during the Korean War, the 1951 federal budget announced a counter-cyclical contractionary fiscal policy. It backfired as wool prices subsequently plummeted, pushing the economy into recession (Fenna, 2010).

The 1970’s stagflation further exposed the limitations of Keynesianism. Treasurer Bill Hayden declared in his 1975 budget speech that “we are no longer operating in that simple Keynesian world in which some reduction in unemployment could, apparently, always be purchased at the cost of some more inflation” (Hayden Bill, 1975).

Subsequently, New Public Management (NPM) type “quasi competition” and “business-like management” dominated Australia’s public sector.  NPM gained further traction driven by the 1980s financial management improvement programs, 1990s privatisation and formation of government business enterprises, and the ultimate outsourcing of public services (Andrew et al., 2020).

Seeds of a resilience narrative

Financial and labour market deregulation, tariff cuts, and floating of the currency in the 1980s and 1990s snuffed out the ‘Australian settlement’, and perhaps the seeds of a future resilience narrative were sown on its grave. The 1995 national competition policy shifted the overarching narrative from ‘state-interventionism’ to ‘structural flexibility’.

This marked a major pivot in the resilience narrative, from shielding against shocks, to absorbing them (Fenna, 2013). Andrew et al. (2020) argue that this neoliberal straitjacketing would drain the economy of its structural resilience for four decades, until the COVID pandemic forced a return to interventionism in 2020.

Meanwhile, the ‘slow burn’ for the agricultural belt, beginning with the 1930s Debt Reconstruction and Farm Build-up schemes, through the 1970s Rural Reconstruction schemes, 1977 Rural Adjustment Scheme, and the 1992 National Drought Policy, culminated in a ‘rural adjustment crisis’ between 1989 and 1992.

The underlying philosophy of these policies was ‘self-reliance’, in other words, farmers should implement strategies to deal with risks in their own way (Worrell et al., n.d.). Academic interest around the plight of rural Australia formalised a ‘regional economic resilience framework’ in the 2000s, drawing on evolutionary economic geography (Plummer et al., 2018; Tonts et al., 2014). However, there is little evidence of it influencing resilience policy.

Revival of interventionism, relapse and a new resilience narrative

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2020 COVID pandemic shocks revived interest in Keynesian fiscal expansionism.  The transition was facilitated by an unusual confluence of benign conditions, low inflation, a budget surplus, and above all, robust demand for mineral resources. The 2008 budget announced a $55 billion Working Families Support Package.

If dodging a recession can be dubbed as resilience, it established a particular resilience model: zero net debt, monetarist inflation targeting, flexible labour and product markets, and steady demand for commodity exports (Fenna, 2010).

Perhaps, the GFC, floods and bushfires triggered a new resilience narrative in Federal budgets since 2012. Treasurer Swan began his 2012 budget speech with “resilience of our people” and premonitions about “an uncertain and fast-changing world” (Swan, 2012). His mitigation plans included skilling the workforce to be adaptive, protecting biodiversity and improving national savings.

The 2013 budget expressed concerns over “powerful global forces and the stubbornly high Australian dollar’ having “savaged budget revenues.” Stronger regions, resilient rural communities, and natural disaster mitigation were part of the resilience strategy (Swan Wayne, 2013).     

After recovery, policy focus reverted to fiscal consolidation. Treasurer Joe Hockey’s 2014 budget announced an Economic Action Strategy to end the “borrow and spend policy” by abolishing industry assistance programs and imposing a ‘Budget Repair Levy’ on high-income earners, slashing financial handouts and downsizing public service. Then, it cut down on mining taxes, carbon taxes, and company taxes (Hockey, 2014). Budgets sidelined ‘resilience’ until it dramatically reappeared in 2020 when Covid struck.

The combined impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, floods, drought and fires in 2020 forced a quick retreat from market orientation to aggressive government spending. Recovery plans included the structural capability building initiative, the $1.3 billion Sovereign Manufacturing Capability Plan.

This desperate (short-run) interventionism exposed how four decades of neoclassical straitjacketing had stripped the economy of its structural resilience (Andrew et al., 2020). Table-2 presents a quick overview of the subsequent budget initiatives targeting ‘resilience’.   

Table 2. Resilience initiatives across budgets since 2000

Year	Budget focus	Representative resilience-related schemes
2020–21	Economic recovery plan from the COVID shock. Employment generation.	Supply Chain Resilience Initiative. Emergency Response Fund. Modern Manufacturing Strategy. JobMaker and JobKeeper Payments. Regional resilience (COVID impact, Water grid, mobile broadband, Northern Australia infrastructure). Economic and environmental resilience (cyber security, recycling, environmental care).
2021–22	Fiscal support for recovery from pandemic. Sustainable private sector-led growth for job creation. Fuel security.	Disaster resilience: National Recovery and Resilience Agency, Preparing Australia disaster resilience program. Our Future Next Five-Year Plan for Northern Australia, employment, internet and mobile access. Farm productivity: Pest and weed control, digital capability, biosecurity. Drought proofing: National Water Grid Fund. Emissions reduction, Ocean leadership, Waste package, Keeping Australia safe: Security intelligence, Cyber security, Border protection, Defence capability
2022–23	Flood relief, reduce debt as a share of the economy. Modernise sovereign manufacturing capability. Temporary cost of living relief. Strengthen regions. National security and defence.	Supply chain resilience: support regional business to address supply chain vulnerabilities. Disaster resilience: Black Summer Bushfire & East Coast Flood Recovery Grants, Emergency Response Fund. Telecommunications infrastructure: enhancing connectivity in regional Australia, NBN wireless network. Agriculture: Farm income diversification. Resilient Australia: environmental protection, biodiversity, national waste policy action plan, renewable energy. Keeping Australia safe: REDSPICE (Resilience, Effects, Defence, Space, Intelligence, Cyber, Enablers
2023–24	Cost-of-living relief. Strengthening Medicare, home care & disability care. Voice referendum. Renewable energy.	Disaster resilience and preparedness: Disaster Ready Fund––sea walls, drainage, bush fire etc. Supply chain resilience: help businesses tap Net Zero transition opportunities. IMF resilience & sustainability trust fund: financing for addressing climate change and pandemic risks. Future Drought Fund (2019): future drought resilience, preparedness and response
2024–25	Cost-of-living & Housing pressures. Medicare and the care economy. Future Made in Australia. Net zero transition. Broadening opportunity and equality.	Supply chain resilience: critical mineral production tax incentive, renewable energy under Solar Sunshot program. Defence Industry Development Grants: create sovereign industrial base. Resilience in small business: critical mental health and financial counselling, legal advice, etc. A more resilient Australia: drought and climate resilience.  IMF resilience & sustainability trust fund: financing for addressing climate change and pandemic risks.
2025–26	Geopolitical instability. Ex-Tropical Cyclone Alfred and other severe weather events. Cost-of-living reliefs, Medicare, Housing, Education.	Comprehensive National Climate Risk Assessment and National Adaptation Plan IMF resilience & sustainability trust fund: financing for addressing climate change and pandemic risks. Regional Investment Corporation (RIC): concessional loans for farm businesses (2018)
2026-27	Resilience and reform. Global oil shock. Tax reform for workers, business and ventures. Reduce regulatory burden.	Fuel resilience package and Fuel Supply taskforce. NRF Economic Resilience Program to strengthen supply chains. Ease cost-of-living (tax cuts, fuel price cuts, fair wages, health care, housing, SME support), 5-pillar productivity agenda (resilient economy, skilled adaptable workforce, data & digital technology, quality care, Cheaper, cleaner energy, and the net zero transformation) Interest-free loans to strengthen oil supply chains. $53 billion to defence force/security.   National Resilience & Science Council

Resilience policy replaces innovation policy

A run-through of the budgets indicates the emergence of a new narrative, with four thematic underpinnings: disaster response, economic & trade performance, energy & Industrial capability, and household welfare.

The 2026-27 budget, with its focus on ‘Resilience and Reform’, makes an explicit case for a ‘Resilience Policy’. Surprisingly, these budgets do not acknowledge the potential role of innovation (technological and institutional) in national resilience. They treat innovation as a byproduct of competition and economic resilience, rather than a powerful means of long-term resilience.

The latest budget adopts resilience as its guiding principle. It draws on the 2025 Productivity Commission (PC) report which in turn aligns with the 2023 growth agenda, that frames resilience as one of its five core pillars. The PC report leans heavily on the neoclassical definition of short-term resilience as ‘bouncing back to equilibrium’. It says “.

. . It (a resilient economy) allows firms to easily enter markets and increase competition.  A resilient economy can withstand or recover quickly from economic shocks. . .” (PC, 2025). The report identifies ‘taxes, spending, and regulation’ as the three key levers of the resilience policy: “. . . tax and regulatory settings present significant barriers to business dynamism and resilience. By ignoring the negative impacts that tax and regulatory policy can have on growth, governments have made it harder and more costly than it should be to start and operate a business, to build housing and renewable energy infrastructure. . .” (PC, 2025).

The message is very clear: competitive free markets unperturbed by regulatory hurdles and distortionary taxes spontaneously drive innovation:

“. . . in a dynamic economy, competition flourishes as emerging firms enter new markets, invest and grow. Productivity improves as resources flow to their most efficient use and firms are encouraged to adopt better technologies, innovate and take risks. . .” (PC, 2025).

The reasoned historical analysis undertaken here shows that nothing is further from reality. Innovation will not flow out of free-market competition. It requires continuous institutional innovation and coordination of efforts in moulding new institutional structures when new technological opportunities (such as AI) come into clear view. Optimal economic performance and other attributes of resilience result from such efforts.

Conclusion

Arguably, the 2026 budget precludes the emergence of an innovation policy narrative. This is indicated by the budgetary announcement of a ‘National Resilience and Science Council’, to replace the NIC.

Resilience is an ambiguous concept, and its treatment varies across neoclassical and evolutionary schools of economics and ecology. In the neoliberal, equilibrium-bound free market discourse, resilience is ‘citizen self-reliance’, achieved by breaking institutional rigidities through price and wage adjustments, labour flexibility, and deregulation.

Evolutionary resilience, by contrast, is long-term adaptation to disruptive technological change. Structural competitiveness, its foundational concept, is a function of non-price factors like the productive structure, capital investment trends, knowledge infrastructure, and technology diffusion. It results from continuous innovation (technological and institutional) achieved through institutional structural transformation facilitated by active governmental intervention, not market clearing.

Resilience appeared in Australian policy discourse in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Despite being vaguely defined and lacking a well-developed theoretical frame, it evolved as a policy narrative in the 2012 and 2013 budgets, but never translated into a practical policy framework. Budgets since 2020 have employed the narrative more frequently, yet it remains limited to temporary policy measures, sidestepping major institutional changes

Recently, the Productivity Commission report signalled the intent to build a resilience policy. However, the absence of a robust theoretical framework and a practical action framework prevented its emergence. The concept of resilience remains diffuse and undefined. The budget and the Productivity Commission have used it to mean ‘economic resilience’, which Pierre Filion equated with ‘self-reliance’ (Filion et al., 2013). 

I have argued elsewhere that mixing up the neoclassical market failure logic with the evolutionary innovation systems logic has driven the Australian STI policy to a state of confusion (Gopalakrishnan Nair Rajesh, 2026). The confusion is increasingly evident, and apparently, innovation is its first casualty. Change is inevitable, and it demands strengthening of capacity at the intersection of theory and policy. Let us remain optimistic and continue the dialogue.        

Acknowledgement: This essay has been inspired by a conversation between James Riley, Editorial Director, InnovationAus.com and Matthew Proft, Director, Precincts, UTS titled ‘Innovation Policy Post-Budget’ on 23 June 2026.

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